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Some of us are inclined from time to time to make judgments about people on
the basis of a number of group defining characteristics among which may be
included such characteristics as race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic
origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family
status or handicap1. Following the Ontario Human Rights Code, from which I
took this list, I’ll call these the "prohibited" characteristics. Acting on the basis
of such judgments in a political or business context where a specific
individual’s welfare might be negatively affected is not only frowned upon, but
actually forbidden by law, hence the word "prohibited." Nonetheless, it can be
argued that such actions are no more than prudent. Prudent or not, the word
"prejudice" is commonly used to designate such judgments and it commonly
carries a powerful negative connotation. Clearly, prejudice is considered
defective in some way, and in this paper I am interested in determining
precisely what kind of defect, if any, ought genuinely to be associated with it. I
will do this by asking two questions: 1) is prejudice rationally defective? That
is, is it an instance of fallacious inference, and 2) is prejudice morally
defective? Two further philosophically interesting questions arise from the
discussion: 3) Are there circumstances under which the use of certain kinds of
evidence ought to be made illegal?, and 4) Is it possible that there exist
inferences that are rationally unobjectionable but yet morally objectionable?

1
To begin, I am thinking of a very simple sense of prudence in which it amounts
to being directed in practical matters by a consideration of comparative
likelihoods. Thus, if we compare three groups A, B, and C of one hundred
each, where A includes 25 bad apples and 75 good ones, B includes 50 bads
and 50 goods, and C 75 bads, 25 goods, then in seeking a good apple it
would be more prudent to select from the A group than the B, and more
prudent to select from the B group than the C. Though not all prejudice is of this
kind, it is only this kind that presents us with philosophical puzzles and I’ll call
this simply ‘prudential prejudice’. Prudential prejudice, then, is a judgment of
practical reason, one that leads to action directly or by way of a policy, that is
based on probabilistic evidence using the prohibited characteristics.
The puzzles presented by prudential prejudice are these:

(1) It is unobjectionable when applied in non-human contexts, but
objectionable in one human context. Why?

(2) It is unobjectionable even in the human context when benefits are being
distributed or when neither benefits nor harms are being distributed, but
objectionable only when possible harms are contemplated. Why?
(3) While neither circumstantial evidence nor probabilistic evidence logically
entails a conclusion, the former is unobjectionable as evidence even when
possible harms are being distributed, while the latter evidence is
objectionable. Why?
Before addressing these puzzles directly, let me get two preliminary points out
of the way. First, while I am focusing on the prohibited characteristics, the
resistance to the use of the probabilistic evidence is not limited to them; we
would also be reluctant to form conclusions about an individual from data
compiled, for example, on his occupation. Where the probabilistic evidence is
based, however, on the prohibited characteristics, that reluctance is given the
force of law. Second, I indicated earlier that not all prejudice is prudential
prejudice and let me here indicate what the other kind is. At least one thing that
we would expect of a rational person is that their beliefs respond equally to
contrary evidence as to positive evidence. There are clearly people, however,
who are unresponsive to contrary evidence and in this respect are neither
rational nor prudent, though they may well be prejudiced. For the sake of a
term, I’ll call this "irrational prejudice" and stipulate without further discussion
that it is both rationally and morally objectionable.
What I am calling "prudential prejudice," then, is nothing more than an egoistic
practical inference based on prohibited group information, an inference that
has been forbidden by law. What could be the intuition that informs such a
proscription? Is it simply that prejudice is bad reasoning? On the face of it, it
would seem not. We can see the reason by considering the three puzzles I
mentioned earlier. All other things being equal, it cannot be that an inference
type is rationally unobjectionable in one context, but bad in another, and that is
what seems to be the case with prudential prejudice. Consider puzzle One.
When human beings are not involved, the question of how good this sort of
reasoning is does not arise; indeed, in some cases we have even less
evidence and still use it in good conscience to make significant decisions.
Thus, when a neighbor’s Pit Bull bites even a single child, we tend to take into
account not only the bite, but also the breed of the dog and very frequently we
have the animal put down. We are more likely to do this with a Pit Bull because
we believe, rightly or wrongly, that this breed of dog is frequently involved in
dangerously aggressive behavior and thus a dog of this breed who has once
bitten is likely to bite again. The key is that our decision respecting the dog is
at least partially based on a generalization concerning dogs of his breed2. Our
intuition with respect to human beings seems to be different, however, and we
see this intuition reflected very explicitly in law. Our law insists that we not
discriminate against individuals on the basis of the groups to which they might
belong, though our information about such groups might well be more
extensive and more reliably collated than the information concerning the dog.

This is generally true, and not only where the prohibited characteristics are
concerned. For example, that the fact that rapists tend to be recidivists should
not affect our behavior towards a newly released rapist. The underlying
principle seems to be this: where human beings are concerned, we ought
never to harm them or form policy that might harm them on the basis of group
information. Thus, we seem to allow a kind of reasoning with respect to nonhuman creatures that we do not allow for human. But perhaps the reason is still
one having to do with the quality of the reasoning, not merely the fact that there
are humans involved. This could be the case, for example, if such evidence
was of inherently poor probative value, and while we might be willing to use
such putatively poor evidence for the non-human, we refuse to risk human
welfare on it. This would make the objection to prudential prejudice a moral
one whose ground is that the use of prudential prejudice is unfair because of
its essential probative weakness. Yet we may ask whether the prohibited
information is necessarily probatively weak. This leads us to the next puzzle,
that the use of prohibited information is allowable where benefits are
concerned, but not where harms are concerned.
As it happens, prohibited information is not always sloppy or unreliable; in fact,
it is frequently a demonstrably good predictor and is used with astonishing
accuracy where it is allowed. We have, for example, seen the allocation of
significant social benefits whose legislation was justified by appeal to statistics
of the prohibited kind. The most dramatic example of this is affirmative action
in which members of specific groups defined by one or more of the prohibited
characteristics are given benefits because the members of those groups have
been and are still, it is argued, being disadvantaged. On the other hand, the
law would not countenance restrictive immigration policy being set by appeal
to similar statistics. Prudential prejudice is also allowed in places where the
conclusions drawn will have no direct practical effect of any kind on the lives of
a prohibitively defined group. It is the stock in trade, for example, of pollsters to
predict how the individuals who make up specific groups will vote. Thus, the
pollsters tell us that the aged will vote one way, the black population another,
white males one way, women another, homosexuals in such and such a way,
and so forth. Insurance actuaries tell us which groups are most at risk with
respect to this and that and set their premiums accordingly even when the
characteristics involved are on the prohibited list. The only difference between
what the pollsters and actuaries do routinely without public outrage, on the one
hand, and prudential prejudice, on the other, seems to be that the results of the
"prejudice" are thought to have potentially harmful effects for the individuals
about whom the predictions are being made while the pollster predictions do
not.
I must add, at the risk of being provocative, that while popular culture has made
a rich theme of the evils of prudential prejudice, dramatizing cases in which
such inferences fail, there is little attention given to the question of how
successful prejudicial inference might be. This would seem to be an empirical
question; we do know that there can be false inferences from prohibited
information, but what we don’t know is whether over a long run prudential-

prejudice-based inferences would reduce, improve, or not affect in any way our
rate of making true predictions about people. Do we actually know on an
empirical basis that expecting this or that behavior from As, Bs, or Cs on the
basis of their records as As, Bs, and Cs is less prudentially successful than
not? This does not seem to be a question that could be resolved a priori, but
the success of insurance companies suggests that prudential prejudice is likely
a very effective risk management strategy.
We know that if even if it were empirically confirmable that prejudice is more
prudentially successful, there would still be the sense that there was something
wrong with it. But what? It is difficult to see, but the objection always seem
inevitably to involve a tacit upward adjustment of the probative standard bar.
That is, even when the objection is initially couched in terms of fairness, the
appeal is actually to the unfairness of using evidence that is probatively too
weak. In what follows, I will suggest that the probative demands made on
prejudice are far higher than those made on other non-deductive forms of
evidence, thus we are being unfair to prejudice. The truth of the matter is that
any form of reasoning short of valid deductive reasoning leaves room for the
possibility that truth will not be preserved from grounds to conclusion; but
unless we are willing to follow the Cartesian path of restricting ourselves to
absolute certainty, this single feature of prudential prejudice would not seem to
isolate it for proscription. In order to fairly proscribe prejudice on purely rational
grounds, we should have to know something more than that it is not entailment,
specifically that it is not the case that more often than not, it yields better than
random results. Even this, however, would not explain the fact of legal
proscription unless we were willing to make poorly based practical reasoning
in general illegal. If we did this, then most of us, including perhaps all of our
elected and appointed government officials would already be subject to
penalties under that law.
This suggests most strongly that the operative consideration against prudential
prejudice is not that it has some rational defect. It is not demonstrable that it is
necessarily bad reasoning, but even if it were, that would still not suffice to have
it prohibited by law.
2
What, then, is still objectionable about prudential prejudice? I think our first
inclination is to say that acting on the basis of prohibited group information
while perhaps not irrational is unfair, and that what we may have here is a
moral, not a rational, objection to a kind of practical reasoning. Our first puzzle
was that prudential prejudice is unobjectionable when applied in non-human
contexts, but objectionable in one context of the human. This fact by itself
should be sufficient to indicate that our objection to prudential prejudice is at
the very least moral, though it might also yet be rational. The reason is that, for
the most part, we think that "fairness" is something that only applies to human
beings. Putting down the Pit Bull does not ordinarily open us up to a charge of
unfairness simply because our decision was based on our group information

concerning this breed. We are certainly never charged with unfairness for
killing a grub because we believe that members of its kind destroy the roots of
grass. What remains to be teased out is the intuition that underlies the charge
of unfairness here, and it is important to see that while the predictive reliability
of the prohibited information involved might vary, the reluctance to base action
on such prohibited group information persists even when the reliability is
judged to be reasonably high. Why is this?
I suspect that the moral intuition supporting the resistance to prudential
prejudice is that it is unfair for someone to be penalized for something that
others have done. It is easy to show that this unfairness exists when we make
punitive policy that is based on group information and implemented equally
with respect to every member of that group. Thus, a teen-aged male might well
protest the high cost of his automobile insurance on the ground that he,
personally, is a responsible driver, though he acknowledges that the statistics
on young male drivers are very bad. The obvious defect in such policy is that it
rains equally on the just and the unjust, it does not distinguish, and thus, for the
sake of a prudential benefit, innocents are harmed, which is unfair to the
innocents. The perceived unfairness of punitive policy based on group
information can easily be extended to cases in which an individual uses
prudential prejudice in making a decision about another single individual. The
reason is simply that such an individual is actually implementing a policy much
as the insurance companies do. If the person who is disadvantaged by such a
decision is actually innocent, then that person might well claim to have been
unfairly treated. It seems wrong to be penalized for something that others have
done.
While this is a powerful moral intuition, it is not without problems, but before
addressing those, let us note that it may be this intuition that helps explain our
third puzzle, namely that while neither circumstantial evidence nor probabilistic
evidence entail conclusions, the former is morally acceptable, while the latter
seems not. The reason may simply be that prudential prejudice is not in any
way essentially tied to the identity of the person under consideration and is thus
indifferent to the question of individual guilt. Group information only increases
the likelihood that an individual of a certain kind is the one we seek or want to
avoid but it fails to increase the probability that any specific individual within
that group is the one we seek or want to avoid, it’s narrowest focus is the
group, while we are concerned about an individual. Good circumstantial
evidence, on the other hand, immediately makes it more likely that Jones is our
man because it is Jones specifically who best resolves the equation set by the
circumstantial evidence. The fact that the identity of the individual is an
essential ingredient in the circumstantial evidence diminishes, though it does
not eliminate, the chance that some other individual might also fit the
circumstances and be the real guilty party. Prudential prejudice, however, is
based on considerations utterly blind to the specific details of personal identity
and, in certain kinds of case, is guaranteed to penalize the innocent as well the
guilty.

But is this really a sufficient reason for dispensing with prudential prejudice or
making it illegal? After all, there is no reason why this kind of reasoning, so
successful in non-human contexts, should not be used at least in conjunction
with other forms of reasoning more tied to individual identity. Further, while it is
true that such information does not help to isolate a specific individual, it can
shrink the size of the group within which we are well advised to search. If As
are very likely to do Q, but Bs are not, and I have to choose between Jones,
who is an A, and Smith, who is a B, then it is more likely that it was Jones who
did Q. And we have seen that even in the case of the human, in at least the
special case of Affirmative Action, public policy is based on prudential
prejudice, and we have seen that insurance pricing is based on prudential
prejudice. Why should not individual businessmen, then, be allowed to apply
the same kinds of reasoning to their own operations? We did note above that
one strong intuition supporting the proscription of prudential prejudice is that it
allows for the punishing of the just and unjust alike, and this is unfair to the just.
But is the right to fairness unconditional? Everyone has an equal claim on
fairness, the employer as well as the employee, the landlord as well as the
tenant. The risk on the tenant side is that a perfectly good renter be refused an
accommodation on the basis of a general prudential policy, but on the landlord
side, the risk is that an honest landlord be trapped with a terrible tenant whom
he would have avoided but for the prohibition on prudential prejudice. At best,
this seems a stand-off in the unfairness competition. Why then prohibit
prudential prejudice?
In fact, as the two above examples indicate, we do allow prudential prejudice,
though when it is allowed, we don’t call it "prejudice," although this is precisely
what it is. Perhaps the thing to do is to examine two of the factors that seem to
govern allowed non-beneficial uses of prohibited information. The two I have in
mind are 1) gravity of risk, and 2) likelihood of risk. When deciding on whether
to act on prudential prejudicial grounds, we tend to take the two factors into
account in a subjective calculation which is far from representable as an
algorithm. When a mother tells her little daughter to avoid older men in
raincoats who approach her in the playground, she is coaching her child in both
sexism and ageism, but she is yet correct both on rational and on moral
grounds. The reason in this case is that while the likelihood of the risk is
moderately low, the gravity of the risk is very high. The fact that being molested
is such a terrible thing for a child makes a prudential prejudicial decision
warranted. The implication of this is, of course, that some perfectly nice
avuncular old man will be publicly spurned by a child, which is unfair to him, but
this seems small price to pay for the safety of the child. All of this yields the
commonplace truth that in the world of moral judgments, fairness is frequently a
competitive matter in which not everyone wins. Prudence sometimes trumps
fairness, but in general, the society has decided in favor of fairness. On the
other hand, prudence and fairness are not the only possible conflicts. Once the
state has inserted itself into the issue by actually proscribing a form of
justification in the making of business decisions, the potential conflict becomes
one between individual and state. The examination of prudential prejudice
reveals the well-known and unhappy truth that what may be prudential as public

policy may not be prudential as personal policy: the interests of the state and of
the citizen do not always coincide.
Our history has revealed some very horrifying instances of state-sanctioned
irrational prejudice practice on huge scales, involving countless innocent
victims. Modern Western Society has decided publicly that this kind of
reasoning is to be prohibited because it has shown itself to be frighteningly
abusable. Society seems now to have the same kind of aversion to prudential
prejudice that we are now showing towards the gun, an instrument that is
capable of a justifiable use, but one which more and more people distrust in
the hands of their neighbors. As in the case of the gun, while it is perhaps the
better public policy to prohibit the use of prudential prejudice, this prohibition
might well earn an innocent individual harm for want of its protection. A more
measured response to prudential prejudice might be more reasonable, one in
which we acknowledge both the strengths and the limitations of this inference;
it would seem imprudent to discard it out of hand, but not immoral to apply it
judiciously with an appropriate respect for contrary information.
Endnotes
1[1981, c. 53, s.1; 1986, c.64, s.18(1).]
2Recent new television item on "Extra" (1/23/99) concerns new home owners'
insurance regulations which do not extend coverage to families owning Pit
Bulls or other aggressive dogs. This is not discrimination against the animals,
nor would it could as discrimination against the families since the operative
factor is not on the prohibited list. Notwithstanding, it does show that we are
content to apply group information analogous to that of race in humans in a
predictive way with a high level of confidence to mammals other than the
human without being charged with unfairness.

